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We study in this chapter the nature of the forecasts made by security
analysts that were described in chapter 1. To do so we look at three
questions: (a) To what extent are the forecasts of different analysts
similar to each other and to forecasts that might be produced by some
explicit, "objective" methods? (b) How accurate are the forecasted
growth rates when compared with the quantities that were later realized?
(c) Are the forecasts complete in the sense that they use all information
which should have been readily available to the forecasters when they
formulated their predictions? This last question is related to whether we
can reasonably consider the forecasts to represent "rational" expecta-
tions. Relative to many investigations of expectations in other fields,
1 this
study is characterized by having comparatively few predictors and by
covering predictions made over a period of slightly less than a decade.
This is balanced, however, by the study's access to a large number of
forecasts from each predictor.
2.1 Importance of a Study of Growth Forecast Accuracy
Financial theorists have emphasized for years the importance of expec-
tational variables in the valuation of common stocks. Accordingly the
price of a share should be determined primarily by investors' current
expectations about the firm's future performance and profitability, par-
ticularly the anticipated growth rate of earnings and dividends per share.
Modern financial literature emphasizes the link between anticipated risk
1. A number of studies of anticipations data have been collected by Zarnowitz (1967).
Some more recent work on the assessment of expectations or forecasts has been done by
Mincer (1969), Pesando (1975), Pearce (1978), and Friedman (1980).
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and return; and the capital-asset pricing model, developed by Sharpe
(1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966), has become a widely used
approach to security valuation. Central to this approach is expected
return, even though its nature has not been stressed. Empirical studies of
price-earnings ratios of common stocks (including those described in
chapter 4) find that the most important explanatory variables are expecta-
tional ones, especially those measuring the anticipated future growth rate
of the corporation.
2 Other empirical investigators who have studied the
determination of stock-price changes have similarly put heavy emphasis
on the importance of variables measuring the growth of the firm. For
example, Nerlove (1968) found that two of the most important variables
explaining differences in the actual price performance of individual com-
mon stocks over both short and long periods were the growth of sales and
earnings and the retention of earnings, which is related to future growth.
Nerlove's results suggest that growth forecasts are needed in order to
predict differential returns from individual common stocks.
This analytical emphasis is matched by efforts in the financial commu-
nity of security analysts to forecast the future earnings and dividends and
to judge the risk levels of the companies they study. Thus financial
theorists, practitioners, and empirical researchers all agree on the im-
portance of these expectational inputs in determining the prices of com-
mon stocks. A study of growth forecasts would seem to be of critical
importance in understanding how capital markets value different secur-
ities.
2.2 Agreement among Predictors
The extent to which the different growth-rate projections are in agree-
ment is described and summarized in this section. As chapter 1 explained,
the growth forecasts estimated by security analysts are of two types: (a)
long-run forecasts representing the anticipated average annual rate of
growth expected to occur over the next five years, and (b) forecasts of
earnings per share for the following year. We converted the latter into
one-year percentage rates of growth by using the average "normalized"
earnings estimates of the analysts as a common base.
Forecasts of long-term growth made by nine predictors were available
during the 1961-65 period while eleven forecasters provided short-term
growth estimates. However, data were not available from each forecaster
in each of the five years, and ten of the eleven forecasters of short-term
2. The classic statement of the anticipations view of the determination of share valuation
may be found in Williams (1938). This position is also adopted in the standard textbook in
the field, Graham et al. (1962). The emphasis on the importance of earnings growth may
also be found in Gordon (1962), Holt (1962), and Malkiel (1963).55 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
growth were different from the forecasters of long-term growth. More
limited numbers of forecasts were available for the period 1966-69.
The question of the extent of agreement among predictors is important
in the development of the capital-asset pricing model. It has been usual in
that literature to assume that all market participants have identical ex-
pectations concerning all security returns. Similarly, most economic
theories that embody expectations, including most of the "rational ex-
pectations" literature, implicitly assume that all participants hold the
same expectations. Our data make possible for the first time an examina-
tion of this assumption with respect to predictions formed for judging the
values of common stocks.
2.2.1 Comparisons of Different Predictions
We start by considering the extent of agreement between each pair of
predictors with respect to the relative growth prospects of companies by
calculating correlation and rank correlation coefficients. These measures
ignore any disagreements concerning the expected overall average rates
of growth or concerning dispersion of growth rates among companies.
Table 2.1 gives the correlations among the long-term growth predic-
tions. Below the main diagonals of the table we report the product-
moment correlations; we present the Spearman rank correlations above
the diagonals. Each correlation is based on all the observations (com-
panies) available for each pair of forecasters. Correlations are calculated
in the usual way. The correlation matrix with elements consisting of these
separate correlations need not be positive definite. Only results for the
Table 2.1 Agreement among Long-Term Growth Predictors
1961























































































































































































































































































































































NOTE. Simple correlations in lower left, Spearman rank correlations in upper right.
years 1961 through 1965 are shown because of the limited numbers of
forecasters available in later periods. Table 2.2 presents the correspond-
ing figures for the short-term predictors. In the tables the long-term
predictors are numbered 1 through 9 while the short-term predictors are
designated A through K. This serves to emphasize that the short- and
long-term predictors are not the same.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 do suggest considerable consensus. The correlations
are generally significantly different from zero well beyond conventionally
used significance levels. However, the lack of agreement they reveal is
substantial and possibly more striking. Agreement tended to be greatest57 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
among the long-term predictors, but the average correlation coefficient
was only about three-fourths. This suggests that only half the variance in
one individual's predictions can typically be "explained" by agreement
with those of another. Agreement was substantially less among the
short-term predictors. Even ignoring predictor E, which made compara-
tively few forecasts and showed a tendency toward lower agreement, the
average pairwise correlation coefficient was not much above one-half.
No great differences are evident when rank correlations are used rather





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE. Simple correlation coefficients in lower left, Spearman rank correlations in upper
right.
using Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W).
3 Values for this statistic
are reported in table 2.3 for selected groups of long- and short-term
predictors where substantial overlap occurred in the companies covered.
This table reveals on a simultaneous, nonparametric basis much the same
results as those shown by the correlations. Agreement certainly is pres-
ent, but it is far from being complete. Possibly surprisingly, the short-
term concordances are typically not much smaller than the long-term
ones.
A rather different way of looking at the agreement among predictors is
to see how much of the variation in one forecaster's predictions can be
associated with those of the other predictors as a group. Doing so sensibly
requires use only of the companies for which all the predictors being
3. Kendall's W is a statistic measuring the amount of association among several rank-
ings. It varies between zero (no association) and unity (perfect agreement). It can be
expressed as a linear function of all pairwise Spearman rank correlation coefficients. For













Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance for Ranks













































4 Only a limited number of the predictors
could be included, and even so the number of companies is severely
restricted. The statistic we use is the multiple correlation coefficient R for
each predictor with the set of other predictors being compared. The
results are presented in table 2.4, which also indicates the predictors that
were included in the comparisons and the number of observations that
were available.
The values of the multiple correlation coefficients are, of course,
higher than those of the simple correlations. Even so, among the long-
term predictors they also reveal that each predictor still has a consider-
able amount of variation that is not associated with the predictions of the
others. The most noticeable aspect of the short-term predictions is that
now the multiple correlation coefficients are more nearly of the same size
as those for the long-term predictions. Correspondingly, the increase in
the correlation coefficients obtained by proceeding from the simple to the
multiple correlations is comparatively greater for the short-term than for
the long-term predictions. This finding is not an artifact of the different
observations used. When the simple correlations are calculated using
only those companies from which the multiple correlations are calcu-
lated, the simple correlation coefficients have much the same values as
4. The fact that the correlation matrices in tables 2.1 and 2.2 need not be (and are not
always) positive definite means that we cannot sensibly calculate multiple correlations on
the basis of the simple correlations calculated for different companies.60 Chapter Two
Table 2.4 Multiple Correlations of Predictors with Several Others
A. Long-Term Growth
Pred. 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965






































































NOTE. Table entries are multiple correlations of each predictor with the others listed. ***
entries not included in the calculations.
those shown in tables 2.1 and 2.2 and the short-term predictors still tend
to be less than the long-term predictors.
The reasons for these findings are not entirely clear. The results suggest
that roughly as much common information is used in forming the short-
term as the long-term forecasts, but that there appear to be greater
differences in how various types of information are combined in the
short-term than in the long-term forecasts. We shall investigate in section
2.2.4 below the extent to which these associations may represent some
common underlying factors.
Correlation coefficients measure only one aspect of agreement. They
ignore any differences in the average levels of forecasts. The average
forecasts of the different predictors appeared to be of roughly the same
magnitude. However, they did tend to differ significantly from each
other, even though the averages of different pairs of predictors were
calculated from the companies for which both made forecasts. Significant
differences also tended to be found when central tendency was measured
by the medians of the observations. These differences are in addition to
the lack of agreement indicated by the correlation coefficients and con-
cordances, and strongly support the finding of considerable heterogene-
ity of expectations.
While we have treated long-term and short-term forecasts as being




























































































































may be evident in practice. This suspicion is strengthened by noting that
only one predictor was able to supply both types of forecast in the same
year; other predictors formed either short- or long-term forecasts but not
both. Correlating the long- with the short-term predictions bears out this
supposition only partially, however. The values for 1965 shown in table
2.5 provide a typical example. The correlation coefficients vary consider-
ably among the pairs of predictors; but on average the values are lower
than those found among the short-term predictions, and so a fortiori they
are lower than those of the long-term predictors. Thus there is little
systematic tendency for the long- and short-term predictions to show
close associations.
2.2.2 Changes in Predictions
Our data set allows us to observe changes in predictions over time. This
permits us to investigate the extent to which each predictor is influenced


















































































































For the long-term growth predictions these correlations were quite high,
being generally in excess of 0.9. These values tended to be considerably
higher than the correlations with the forecasts made by other predictors
at the same time; that is, a forecaster of long-term growth tended to be
more in agreement with his own prior views than with those of other
predictors.
The correlations over time of the short-term predictions also shown in
table 2.6 were typically a great deal smaller than those for the long-term
predictions, averaging 0.4. Though there were exceptions, particularly in
the case of predictor E, the pattern found for the long-term predictors
that these correlations over time were generally higher than the contem-
poraneous correlations with other predictors was far less evident.
These findings raise the question of the extent to which forecasters
were in agreement with each other about the changes in their forecasts.
The correlations for the differences of 1965 predictions from the 1964
ones are shown in table 2.7. They reveal a pattern also present in the
other years. In these comparisons the correlations were low for the
long-term predictions, suggesting that alterations in the expectations
were not all based on information common to all or interpreted similarly.
















































































































































.87 1.0063 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
versing the pattern found for the predictions themselves) and were com-
parable in magnitude to the correlations of the forecasts themselves
shown in table 2.2.
2.2.3 Industrial Classification and the Predictions
One might suspect that the correlations among the predictors reflect
little more than consensus concerning the industries that are expected to
grow relatively quickly rather than agreement about the relative rates of
growth of firms within industries. This possibility was investigated by
decomposing the correlation coefficient into two parts, one due to cor-
relation within industries (rw) after removing correlation of industry




















the rth observations in theyth class (industry),
the number of observations in the yth class,
the number of classes,
the averages within the classes, and
the overall averages.
This decomposition indicated that agreement concerning industry
growth rates is not the major factor accounting for the correlations
among the forecasts. The values for 1965 are shown in table 2.8. Entries
above the diagonal in that table show the values of ra using the industrial
classification obtained from the participating firms. As a comparison with
tables 2.1 and 2.2 shows, only a small part of the correlations among the
predictions is due to correlations among the industry means, a pattern not
specific just to the year for which results are shown.
The decomposition we have just been considering does not yield the
partial correlation coefficient holding industrial classification constant64 Chapter Two
Table 2.8 Industrial Classification and Forecast Agreement (1965)
A. Long-Term Forecasts
Pred. 1 23456789
1 *** .27 .20 .26 .29 .27 .10 .26 .34
2 .77 *** .30 .30 .36 .34 .14 .29 .36
3 .82 .82 *** .41 .31 .32 .25 .31 .51
4 .83 .83 .91 *** .37 .39 .27 .31 .43
5 .81 .78 .69 .79 *** .33 .16 .20 .34
6 .74 .68 .68 .81 .76 *** .16 .28 .39
7 .47 .40 .73 .79 .44 .71 *** .18 .34

















H 1 J K
A *** .30 .14 .16 .19 .64 .17 .18 .08 .47 .17
B .86 *** .61 .51 .56 .52 .49 .56 .40 .66 .44
C .45 .57 *** .34 .42 .33 .25 .33 .15 .38 .33
D -.19 .27 .33 *** .24 .33 .37 .38 .22 .64 .42
E .48 .59 .73 .39 *** .29 .37 .01 .21 .02 .11
F .65 .71 .55 .22 .71 *** .22 .26 .28 .59 .43
G .22 .57 .36 .51 .26 .50 *** .35 .29 .46 .32
H .84 .64 .87 .80 .55 .77 .68 *** .15 .64 .41
/ .23 .83 .63 .55 .52 .44 .69 .77 *** .46 .26
/ .90 .57 .54 .82 .04 .73 .87 .58 .69 *** .50
K .37 .85 .74 .37 .61 .77 .67 .81 .80 .69 ***
NOTE. Values of ra are above diagonal created by asterisks; values of partial correlations
holding industry classification constant are below diagonal.
although the numerator of rw in equation (2.2-2) is the numerator of that
partial correlation coefficient. These partial correlations are shown below
the main diagonal in table 2.8. Roughly speaking, they are of the same
magnitude as the simple correlations of tables 2.1 and 2.2. Especially in
the case of the short-term predictions, they vary extensively across the
predictors. This finding again suggests that the forecasters are not all
following uniform procedures in arriving at their predictions. Although,
in principle, part of this variation might arise from the need to use
different sets of companies when comparing different pairs of predictors,
equally wide variations appeared when only a common set of companies
was used for the comparison.
These findings should not be taken to indicate that there is not a large
association between the predictions and the industry classification. The
values of R
2 obtained by regressing the predictions on industry dummy
variables are shown in table 2.9. They indicate that there are very strong
and significant associations. This is a particularly striking feature of the


























Industrial < Classification and Forecast Variation: Values of R
2 for



















































































































the values for some predictors are above 0.8. Although industry associa-
tions are usually less pronounced for the short-term predictions, they are
a highly important feature of these forecasts as well.
We conclude that while there exists a high association of forecasts with
industry classification, it is not the primary factor accounting for the
correlations between predictors. Thus the overall pattern is not one in
which forecasters tend to agree on industry effects but not on other
across-company variations; instead, they are in at least as much disagree-
ment about industry effects as about other ones.
One may wonder whether correlations among individual forecasters
varied over different industry groups. Such variation might indicate that
certain industry groups are more difficult to forecast in some ex ante
sense. The correlations among forecasters tended to be lowest in the
"cyclical" industry group and highest for the electric utility companies.
These differences were significant for all pairs of predictions considered.
Ranking the correlations over industries and then comparing these ranks
among predictors showed substantial concordance over the ordering of
the correlations.
5
5. The test for individual pairs of predictions was the likelihood-ratio test. Note that the
ranking comparison is not based on independent observations, so a statistical test of the
concordance is not appropriate. The hypothesis that the correlations are all zero within
industries could, however, be rejected well beyond conventional significance levels.66 Chapter Two
2.2.4 Factor-analytic Investigation of Agreement
The analysis of the growth-rate expectations by industry classification
was partly suggested by the notion that the predictions in part depend on
simpler, more basic, and less diverse information than that specific to
each firm. Thus it might be supposed that if one knew the fortunes of an
industry group, one would know a good deal about the fortunes of each
firm in it. One might want to carry this idea further and suppose that the
predictions can be regarded as having a strong underlying core of in-
formation from which each predictor made its own further adjustments
independent of the others. To investigate this hypothesis, we employ the
standard factor-analysis model.
a) A Factor Model for Predictions
The basic idea is that each predictor forms its forecasts for the com-
panies surveyed on the basis of the values of a few factors that affect all
the companies. Let <\>]k be the value of the kth factor (out of K) for the/th
company. These <f>;A; are assumed to be random variables. The model then
supposes that each forecast made by predictor i for company /, gjh can be
expressed as
(2.2-4) gfl = £
Here the aki are coefficients which have different values for different
predictors but which assume the same values for every company in the
forecasts of the /th predictor. The e;/ are random variables for which it is
assumed that
(2.2-5) E(ejt) = 0
and
(2.2-6) E{ejiemk) = a? i = k, j = m
= 0 otherwise.
The important part of assumption (2.2-6) is that the ey, for different
predictors, i and k, are uncorrelated. The assumptions of homoscedastic-
ity and lack of correlation across companies are used to determine the
sizes of tests, but they are not a critical requirement for data to exhibit the
type of variance-covariance matrix that is characteristic of the common-
factor model.
The quantity §jk is interpreted most easily when there is only one of
them for each company, that is, when K = 1. Then we might think of <bjk
as representing the (best) forecast that would be made for the company
on the basis of commonly available information. The e^ might then be
taken to be specific or idiosyncratic information (or for that matter pure
guesswork) used by the predictor i. The model assumes that this compo-
nent of the predictor's forecasts is uncorrelated with the corresponding67 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
components of the forecasts of each of the other predictors. The aki
contain the weightings of the two types of information. They could have
the same values for each predictor.
When there is more than one factor, we might interpret the model as
also reflecting the dependence of earnings on various aspects of the state
of the economy, as, for example, real growth, inflation, etc. Different
predictors might be in agreement over the extent to which each firm is
sensitive to variations in these general conditions, but each might be
using different predictions of what economic conditions will obtain. For
example, the forecasters may agree that U.S. Steel's earnings growth
would be positively influenced by the growth in GNP. Nevertheless, they
may differ in their forecasts for U.S. Steel's earnings growth because they
do not agree on the growth of GNP. Similarly, all forecasters may agree
that an increase in the rate of inflation may depress the earnings for
Consolidated Edison but may differ in their inflation forecasts. The aki
now represent the different predictions of generally important economic
variables made by the individual forecasters, and the §jk may be inter-
preted as the extent to which earnings growth depends on the various
economic variables.
b) Relation to a Factor Model for Earnings
This interpretation of the model for earnings-growth forecasts comple-
ments nicely a related model for earnings growth or, more generally, for
returns to securities that is sometimes used in valuation models. We shall
see in chapter 3 that a common-factor model has important implications
for the structure of security prices. Let Xjt be the value of the variable of
interest for company; at time t and^, be the value of the kth factor at time
/. (In the security-valuation model xjt initially is the return to security j,
but it might instead be earnings growth.) The model for Xjt is
K
(2.2-7) xJt=[Lj+ X yjkfkt + tjt,
k=l
where the^, might represent national income, inflation, or other gener-
ally relevant aspects of the economic environment. The |x; and yk are
parameters specific to the firms while now e;r is a random disturbance. A
forecast of xjt could sensibly be made by forecasting fkt and then using
equation (2.2-7), with eJt taken to be zero. We might therefore consider
the parameters |xy and yjk to be the factors <j>;/fc of the prediction model (2.2-4), while the aki represent different forecasters' predictions of fkt at a
particular time as well as the weighting given to the typical common value
of the firm-specific expectation (xy.
From our previous discussion it may seem unreasonable to assume that
the predictors should all know the values of §jk if they cannot even agree
on the predicted values of major economic variables. However, the
model could be extended to be68 Chapter Two
(2.2-8)
k =
where the r\jki are independent random variables uncorrelated across
predictors. Now the <\>jk can be regarded as an average value held by
predictors rather than ones on which all predictors agree implicitly. Since
we can write equation (2.2-8) as
K I




the model (2.2-4) remains formally appropriate provided that (2.2-6)
holds for the augmented disturbance e-{. The theoretical implications for
security valuation of diversity of expectations of the form (2.2-8) in the
model (2.2-7) will be investigated in chapter 3.
c) Empirical Findings
Only a small number of factors can be identified from data for the
limited number of predictors available, especially when the assumption
of different variances for different predictors is made in (2.2-6).
6 How-
ever, for most years two factors are identifiable since the hypothesis that
K< 2 imposes testable restrictions on the variance-covariance matrices of
the predictors.
The major question is whether a common-factor model fits the data at
all. Because of the small number of predictors, this amounts to asking
whether only two factors can account for the observed correlations
between predictors. Rejecting this hypothesis would not necessarily indi-
cate that the model is inappropriate, but could arise from there being a
(small) number of additional factors. As the discussion of the interpreta-
tion of the <j>;vt indicated, particular interest focuses on the hypothesis that
there is only one factor.
6. Identifiability and estimation of the factor-analysis model are discussed by Anderson
and Rubin (1956).
Missing observations cause a major problem for the analysis. It is not at all clear that the
fact of omission of a company from the list of those for whom a forecaster supplied
predictions is a random event unconnected with the values predicted by others. Instead, it
may be related to the values of the predictions—or to the extent to which some underlying
factor about which there is uncertainty affects the company. As with the calculation of
multiple correlation coefficients for table 2.4, it is necessary to base calculations on com-
panies for which each of the included predictors made forecasts. The predictors that could
be included and the number of observations are indicated in table 2.10. They are the same as
those used in table 2.4.
It is of course quite possible for the model to describe some predictors and not others. No
systematic search was made to try to find those predictors (if any) which it might fit; instead,
the selection of the predictors included in the analysis was based on there being an overlap in
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Summary of Common-Factor Model
A. Long-Term Predictions
1961
+ 1962 1963 1964 1965
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B. Short-Term Predictions


















































+Only one factor identifiable.
The findings of the (asymptotic) test
7 of the hypotheses are summarized
in table 2.10 in terms of the smallest significance levels at which the
hypotheses could be rejected.
8 The hypothesis of two factors could not be
tested for the 1961 long-term predictions because only four predictors
could be analyzed together. In most other cases, particularly among the
short-term predictions, the hypothesis could only be rejected at high
levels. This includes the long-term predictions in 1964 and 1965 where a
7. The tests are likelihood-ratio ones, in which one assumes that all random quantities
have the normal distribution.
8. These quantities are sometimes referred to as "prob-vals." See Wonnacott and
Wonnacott (1979).70 Chapter Two
fairly large number of observations are available. The predictions for
1963, however, provided a strong exception. Expressing these results
differently, we find that usually it would be reasonable to ascribe the
correlations among predictors to a pair of underlying factors.
The finding of two common factors does not necessarily indicate that
there are only two factors present in the behavioral models underlying
(2.2-4) and (2.2-7). If the values of aki for two or more factors (k) were the
same for all predictors (i) (e.g., because they do all use the same forecasts
of the important economic variables), then the test would aggregate these
different factors into a single composite factor. The results just obtained
may partly arise because such aggregation provides a sufficiently good
approximation that more factors cannot be detected with the modest
numbers of observations used.
The hypothesis of only one common factor receives little support from
the data. It is rejected strongly except in a couple of instances, one of
which is the long-term predictions of 1961, where only four predictors
could be included and only one factor can be identified. The finding that
one factor is not usually sufficient suggests that the correlations among
predictors do not arise from just a single source, and indicates that the
model (2.2-7) may be a fruitful way of considering how the forecasting
process should be regarded.
d) Importance of the Common Factors
These findings suggest that the agreement among the forecasts of
different predictors arises from their dependence on a set of common
factors. The extent of this dependence may be summarized by consider-
ing the proportion of the variance of the forecasts of each predictor that
can be attributed to two factors. Let <$>k and g, be the means of the fcth
factor and of the ith predictor's forecasts. The factor analysis then pro-
vides an estimate of
which we can divide by X/= i (gy, - g)
2 to provide a quantity analogous to
R
2. The values of these ratios are shown in table 2.10.
A large part of the variance of the predictors can be ascribed to
dependence on the common factors. As table 2.10 reveals, there is a
considerable amount of variation in the magnitude of these quantities
among predictors and across years. Nevertheless, quite high values do
prevail: most entries are above 0.8, values of 0.9 are common, and even
values above 0.95 are found. This still leaves considerable diversity of
expectations, but does indicate a very solid core of common information.
It is worth noting that many of the largest values occur for the short-term
predictions.71 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
e) Extension of the Model
These findings spur a number of further investigations. One of the
quantities which the factors represent does not seem to be the industry
averages. When we analyzed the residuals using different industry
means, levels of significance very similar to those of table 2.10 were
obtained and models with only one factor still tended to be rejected
strongly.
Taking the difference of one year's forecast from the forecast of the
preceding year, where the forecasts are expressed by equation (2.2-4), we
obtain
K K
(2.2-10) gjit-gjit-l= 2 (4>jkt-$jkt-l)<*kit+ 2 <!>;**-1
k=1 k=1
x {akit - a^-i) + ejit - eiU-x.
The common-factor model would therefore continue to be appropriate
for these differences if only the §jk or the aki changed. If both changed,
the number of common factors would increase beyond the number that
could be identified in our data. The three years in which changes in the
long-term predictions could be analyzed produced even larger signifi-
cance levels beyond which the two-factor model could not be rejected
than those of table 2.10 for the predictions themselves. It is noteworthy
that this was particularly true for the 1962-63 changes and the 1963-64
ones, since the model did not fit the predictions well in 1963. By contrast,
the model was usually rejected beyond the 0.10 level with the changes in
short-term predictions.
f) Summary of Factor-analytic Investigation
In sum, we find that the factor model (2.2-4) appears to describe well
some of the predictions, but not all. Furthermore, some predictors may
use the same values of the factors each year, though changing the pre-
dicted value of the underlying common variables. When five years of data
are available for a predictor, two factors are still identifiable, but only one
can be identified when not more than four years are available. Analyzing
the long-term growth forecasts of predictors 1,2, and 6 in this way led in
each case to not rejecting at the 0.05 level the hypothesis of two factors.
For these predictors and for the others for which only four years were
available, the hypothesis of just one factor could be rejected easily. The
results for the short-term predictors were similar: the only one for which
the two-factor hypothesis could be rejected was C. Conditioning on the
industry would lead to not rejecting the hypothesis in this case as well as
in the others. No support was found for the model with only one factor.
Thus it appears reasonable to conclude that a factor model is consistent
with the process by which our predictors have formed their expectations.72 Chapter Two
The forecasters may first have made predictions of important economic
factors such as GNP growth, inflation, etc., and then attempted to
estimate how each of these factors would affect each specific company.
Disagreements among the forecasters could result either from different
predicted values for the factors or from different views concerning how
the factors affect specific company results.
2.2.5 Predictions and Past Growth Rates
Comparing the predictions with previous growth rates provides added
perspective on the agreement among forecasters. However, past growth
rates are not so well defined that their measurement is unambiguous.
Instead, a number of different calculations may be made to estimate past
growth. Of at least as much relevance as such objective calculations are
the perceptions of past growth actually held by forecasters. We were
fortunate in having had some of these perceptions supplied to us.
Correlations of eight historical growth rates of earnings per share with
each other and with the predictions are shown in table 2.11 for 1963. Four
of these past growth rates were supplied by participating firms, though
not in all years. They represent the firm's perception of the growth of
earnings per share that had occurred in various preceding periods. The
other growth rates were calculated as coefficients in the regressions of the
logarithms of earnings per share on time over the previous four, six,
eight, and ten years. We also investigated with very similar results other
measures based on the first differences of the logarithms of earnings per
share and on linear trends.
The specific definitions of the eight historical growth rates were:
gpi = four- to five-year historical growth rate supplied by pre-
dictor 1,
gp2 = eight- to ten-year historical growth rate supplied by
predictor 1,
gp3 = one-year historical growth rate supplied by predictor 4,
gp4 = six-year historical growth rate supplied by predictor 4,
gci
 = log-regression trend fitted to last four years,
gc2 = log-regression trend fitted to last six years,
gc3 = log-regression trend fitted to last eight years,
gc4
 = log-regression trend fitted to last ten years.
Values for gp3 were available only for 1962 and 1963.
The correlations in the first part of table 2.11 are indicative of the



















































































































































































































tions are not more highly correlated with each other than were different
predictions, with the correlation being weakest between the one-year
perceptions and the longer-term ones. The correlations among the calcu-
lated growth rates are of a similar order of magnitude as those among the
perceived growth rates, and the same is true of the correlations of the
calculated growth rates with the longer-term predictions. Their associa-
tions with the one-year perceived growth rates tend to be particularly
weak.
The correlations of long-term growth predictions with historical
growth rates are generally high. Indeed, they are not much different from
those found in comparing the predictions with each other. Among the74 Chapter Two
perceived past growth rates, the correlations are apt to be lowest withgp3,
the growth rates perceived to have occurred over the most recent year.
For the calculated growth rates, the correlations tended to increase with
the length of time over which the growth rates were calculated.
9
The correlations relating the short-term predictions with the calculated
growth rates tend to be considerably smaller and are negative in many
cases. Correlations of short-term predictions with the past perceived
growth rates tend to be stronger and are particularly so with the one-year
past perceived growth. The values, however, are still not very large.
Security analysts do not appear to rely simply on historical growth rates in
forecasting for the year ahead. It seems more likely that they are also
emphasizing a number of important economic factors and their own study
of industry and company relationships to these factors.
The comparisons of past with predicted long-term growth rates might
suggest that the apparent agreement among the predictors reflects little
more than at least some use by all of them of the historic figures. In
investigating this possibility, we calculated the partial correlations among
the predictions, holding past calculated growth rates, past perceived
growth rates, and both sets of growth rates constant. The first two sets of
partial correlations were not much smaller than the simple correlations.
Holding both sets constant produced partial correlations that were con-
siderably smaller than the simple correlations, though almost all were still
significant beyond the 0.05 level. Thus, while a substantial part of the
agreement among predictors appears to result from their use of historic
growth figures, there is also evidence of similarity in the adjustments that
different security analysts tend to make to past growth rates.
We may well ask what is the relationship of the past growth figures to
the common-factor model for which we found some support among the
predictions. In particular, can we regard these past growth rates as
representing one of the factors? The hypothesis that the same factor
model applies to the past growth rates and to the predictions could be
decisively rejected, partly because the factor hypothesis can be rejected
among the past growth rates themselves, both perceived and calculated.
More mixed results were obtained when only one perceived and one
calculated growth rate were used with the predictions. When these were
used together with the short-term forecasts, significant rejection of the
hypothesis of at most three factors occurred in all years except 1965. With
the long-term forecasters of table 2.10, the hypothesis would be rejected
very strongly in 1963 and 1964 but would be accepted in other years.
Again, correlation between the two measures of past growth may be part
of the problem. However, using only one past rate, perceived or calcu-
9. This effect was also found when the calculated growth rates were based on either (1)
the regression of earnings per share on time or (2) the appropriate root of the ratio of
earnings per share at the end of the period to earnings at the beginning.75 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
lated, with but two factors produced again the same sort of ambiguous
results.
2.2.6 Predictions and Price-Earnings Ratios
We complete our examination of agreement among various predictions
by comparing the forecasts with the price-earnings ratios of the corre-
sponding securities observed at about the times the predictions were
being made. By utilizing a normative valuation model (for example, one
of those cited in footnote 2), it is possible to calculate an implicit growth
rate from the market-determined price-earnings multiple of a security.
Thus comparisons of the predictions with the price-earnings ratios may be
interpreted as examining the relationship between the forecasts and the
growth rates expected by the market.
Correlations with two versions of the price-earnings ratio are shown in
table 2.12 for 1965. The prices (P) used were the closing prices for the last
day of the year. The earnings were either the actual earnings (E) or the
average of the "normalized" or trend-earnings figures (NE) supplied by
the predictors. The correlation coefficients in the table are about the
same as those obtained when the forecasts were compared with each
































































other. The correlations tend to be much higher for the long-term fore-
casts than for the short-term ones. Since price-earnings multiples should
be affected by several variables other than expected growth rates (and so
are not simply predictions), this exercise underscores the extent of dis-
agreement among the forecasters.
2.3 The Accuracy of the Predictions
Three approaches are taken to evaluate the accuracy of the predic-
tions. The first involves correlation of predictions and realizations and
investigates the extent to which the relative predicted rates of company
growth are associated with the relative rates of growth that occurred. This
association can be high even if there are major differences between the
predicted and realized rates of growth. The second approach to evalua-
tion involves the appraisal of the accuracy of the various forecasts in more
absolute terms. The third type of appraisal is a comparison of the fore-
casts with extrapolation of various previously experienced growth rates.
All comparisons concerned rates of growth rather than the levels of
earnings per share in order to avoid misleading scale effects. In particu-
lar, all per-share realizations were converted into annual percentage rates
of change from the average values of the estimated normalized earnings
per share as of the dates the predictions were made. No conversion of the
long-term predictions was necessary since all the five-year forecasts were
originally recorded as percentage rates of growth, but the short-term
forecasts did require conversion, as was described in chapter 1. Although
every effort was made to ensure that the predicted and realized values
used the same concepts and conventions, small differences may remain.
2.3.1 Correlations of Predictions with Realizations
Correlation coefficients summarizing the forecasting ability of the
short-term predictors from 1961 through 1968 are presented in table 2.13.
Corresponding figures for the long-term predictors are shown in table
2.14. The goodness of the forecasts was assessed by calculating and
presenting Spearman rank correlation coefficients as well as product-
moment correlations. We also indicate the number of companies for
which forecasts and realizations could be compared.
By and large, the correlations of predicted and realized growth rates
are fairly low. Nevertheless, with few, minor exceptions, the correlations
are positive and most of them are significantly different from zero. The
values tend to be smaller than correlations found with the other predic-
tors, a feature especially of the long-term predictions. On average, the
correlations for the long-term predictors are higher than for the short-
term ones, although the differences are slight in 1963 and 1964. Except
for the 1961 long-term predictions, the averages are below 0.5. They are5 O r?
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considerably lower for some of the short-term predictions. The rank
correlations furthermore tend to be lower than the product-moment
ones.
One pronounced feature of the correlations is an inverse relationship
between correlations of predictions with realizations and the number of
companies for which predictions are made. As tables 2.13 and 2.14
reveal, the coefficients calculated between the number of companies and
the correlations of predictions with realized growth rates are all negative
and are generally quite substantial.
These results do not necessarily indicate that those who chose to
forecast fewer companies were thereby able to make superior forecasts.
Instead, it partly arises from a serious anomaly of our data. The simple
correlation coefficients of tables 2.13 and 2.14 probably give a more
favorable impression of predictive ability than is justified. Two or three
companies in our study turned out to be rapid growers and also reason-
ably easy to predict. Were these companies omitted, the correlations
(especially the product-moment ones) would decline substantially. For
example, the correlation coefficients decline quite sharply if IBM, Polar-
oid, and Xerox are dropped from the sample. The importance of a few
outliers in boosting the reported correlation coefficients thus weakens the
evidence in favor of superior forecasting ability, since most forecasters
did include these more spectacular performers.
2.3.2 Accuracy of the Predictions
Our second approach to the evaluation of the accuracy of the forecasts
is based on an inequality coefficient similar to that developed by Theil
(1966). This coefficient is given by
(2.3-1) T=
i=l
Where P, is the predicted and R{ the realized growth rate for the rth
company. This coefficient gives a comparison between perfect prediction
(T = 0) and a naive prediction of zero growth for all corporations (T — 1).
Thus the higher the inequality coefficient, the worse the predictions. It is
even possible, of course, for the inequality coefficient to be greater than
unity. In such a case, the predictor would have done better simply to
predict no growth for all companies.
Values of this statistic are shown in table 2.15. They are based on
comparisons of the long-term forecasts with the subsequent realized
growth rates over five years and the short-term forecasts with the subse-
quent one-year changes (all adjusted to the same base). Table 2.15 thus
employs the same sets of data as do tables 2.13 and 2.14.
Values of the inequality coefficient for the long-term predictions show
some tendency to drift upward over the period 1961-66. The nature of the80 Chapter Two
Table 2.15 Inequality Coefficients for Assessing Accuracy of Predictions
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statistic is such that given absolute differences between predicted and
realized growth are treated more favorably when realized growth is high
so that the figures might not be considered fully comparable from one
year to the next. However, the change is impressive. In 1966 each of the
three predictors which furnished data would have done better (on this
criterion) simply to have predicted no growth at all. Subsequently, some
improvement did occur. Though much less pronounced than differences
between years, considerable variations also exist among predictors. As
we already found with the correlations, the inequality coefficients are
strongly correlated with the number of companies for which the predictor
made forecasts. These correlations are all positive, again indicating that
average forecast success tended to weaken as the number of forecasts
made increased.
The inequality coefficients for one-year forecasts tended to be weaker
than for the long-term ones. Quite commonly, values greater than unity
occurred. There was again considerable variation from year to year, but
no patterns are evident. Pronounced differences occur between forecast-
ers, but these again are strongly related to the number of forecasts made.
The performance of predictor E, especially in the early years, appears
to be particularly strong. However, this superiority is largely illusory.
Predictor E tended to concentrate on large, relatively stable companies,
and, we suspect, predictions were made only when there was a priori
reason to believe that the forecasts would be reliable. The validity of this
conjecture is suggested by observing that all the other forecasters did
better for the set of companies for which predictor E made forecasts than
for the larger set. At the same time, as noted earlier, it was the case that
predictor E's forecasts tended to be less correlated with others. This
tendency continued when the other correlations were also based on the
same limited set of companies.
We may put the general findings into perspective by noting that a naive
forecast based on predicting that, for each company, earnings growth
would equal the past growth rate of GNP would have given lower in-
equality coefficients than the short-term forecasts. Such a naive forecast,
of course, would not identify any relative differences among companies.
On this criterion, the long-term forecasts are slightly stronger than the
naive forecast. A naive prediction of average long-term GNP growth
tended to produce slightly higher inequality coefficients than our predic-
tors. As we shall see in section 2.4, there was a tendency in the early years
for the forecasters to underestimate the realized growth. In later years,
however, we did not find any systematic evidence of underestimation of
change.
2.3.3 Analysis of the Forecasts by Industrial Category
We can extend the inequality-coefficient analysis to investigate the
extent to which errors in prediction were related to (1) errors in predict-82 Chapter Two
ing the average/growth of the sample firms, (2) errors in predicting the
average growth rate of particular industries, and (3) errors in predicting
the growth rates of firms within industries. To accomplish this, we decom-
pose the numerator of (2.3-1) into three parts. The first comes from the
average prediction for all companies not being equal to the average
realization. The second part reflects differences among the average in-
dustry predictions not being equal to the corresponding differences
among average industry realizations. The third arises from the differ-
ences in predictions for the corporations within an industry not being the
same as the differences in realizations.
Let Pkj and Rkj be the predicted and realized growth rates for the Ath
company {k = 1, . . . , Nj) in the ;th industry (/= 1, ...,/). We can
write the numerator of (2.3-1) as





Here, />• and Rj are the averages for theyth industry and P and R are the
overall means. The three terms in square brackets represent the decom-
position referred to above. The proportions of T arising from these three
sources will be called T
M, T
BI, and T
WI, respectively, for mean errors,
between-industry errors, and within-industry errors.
Failure to forecast industry means (T
BI) accounted for only a very
small proportion of the inequality coefficient. The main sources of in-
equality were the within-industry errors. Table 2.16 shows the results for
1963 for the long-term predictors. Similar findings were made for other
years and for the short-term predictors.
The correlations of predictions with future growth rates within indus-
tries permit us to assess which industries were most difficult to forecast in
an ex post sense. This difficulty is indicated in table 2.17. To calculate this
table, we first ranked each predictor's correlation coefficients between its
forecasts and the realizations over the eight industry groups. The industry
for which the predictor had the worst correlation (that is, the most
difficulty) was given a rank of unity. Table 2.17 presents the sums of the
ranks for each industry based on the predictors which furnished enough
forecasts to calculate correlation coefficients in each of the industries.
1
0 If
the difficulty rankings for all predictors were identical, the rank totals
10. Only three long-term predictors could be included in 1962, four in 1963, and six in
1964 and 1965. Three short-term predictors were included in 1961 and 1962, and four were














Analysis of Forecasts by Industrial Category:







































































would be 4 for the most difficult industry (in years when there were four
predictors compared), 8 for the next most difficult, and so on. In this case,
the coefficient of concordance (Kendall's W) would be unity. The values
of Kendall's W were significantly different from zero beyond the 0.05
level for most of the years as were differences between industries for the
correlation coefficients for most of the predictors.
1
1 These findings indi-
cate that there were industry differences. For the long-term predictions,
correlation coefficients between forecasts and realizations tended to be
highest in the oil, food and stores, and "cyclical" industries. For the
short-term predictions, there was really no industry that was particularly
easy to predict compared with the others; that is, prediction perform-
ances were uniformly mediocre across industries.
The electric utility industry turned out to be one of the more difficult
industries for which to make long-term forecasts. This would come as a
distinct surprise to the participating security analysts who claimed at the
outset that they had some reservations about their abilities to predict
earnings for the metals and other "cyclical" companies, but had confi-
dence that they could make accurate predictions for the utilities.
1
2 It
turned out that the long-term predictions for the utility industry were
considerably worse than for the metals and "cyclicals."
In general, we had little success in associating forecasting performance
with industry or company characteristics. Forecasting differences be-
tween industries were only moderately related to the average realized
11. The latter was tested on the basis of the asymptotic distribution of the correlation
coefficient and the assumption that the data were distributed normally.
12. This confidence was also reflected in the fact that for the electric utility industry there
was high agreement among the forecasters, whereas agreement was relatively low for the
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industry growth rates over the forecast period or to the variances of
earnings about the realized growth rates.
1
3
2.3.4 Comparison with Extrapolation of Past Growth
The picture that emerges thus far is one of rather mediocre perform-
ance by our sample of forecasters. Short-term forecasting performance
may fairly be described as poor; long-term forecasting success was only
slightly better. A variety of supplementary tests will help us to buttress
these conclusions and to appraise more fully security analysts' ability to
forecast.
The record of the forecasters raises the question whether any naive
forecasting device based on historical data yields as good forecasts as the
painstaking efforts of the security analysts. Several alternative historical
growth rates were compared with the predictors' forecasts in order to
assess their forecasting abilities better. To do so, we used historical
log-linear growth rates for pretax cash earnings per share, the gc variables
already used in section 2.2.5. We also tried various averages of first ratios
of cash earnings. In all, almost a dozen different mechanical methods for
calculating past earnings growth were used, but none of them was satis-
factory. We also examined four past-growth perceptions supplied to us by
some of the predictors.
Analyses comparable to those shown in tables 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15
were performed using these past growth rates as predictors. The calcu-
lated growth rates were virtually uncorrelated with the one-year realiza-
tions, uniformly giving correlation results comparable to the weakest of
the short-term forecasts. The only virtue of these predictions was that
they gave inequality coefficients that were less than unity. The longer-
term past perceived rates gave similar findings. However, the one-year
past perceptions were somewhat stronger predictors in the two years in
which they were available. Even so, their highest correlation with the
realizations was only 0.44.
The past growth rates, calculated or perceived, gave somewhat
stronger results when used to predict growth rates over five years. In
some instances, they were stronger than some explicit forecasts. This was
not, however, generally the case, and on balance the security analysts
tended to produce stronger predictions. Again, past perceived growth
13. One might at least expect forecasting difficulty to be related to company risk. To
investigate this possibility, the corporations were classified according to the quality ratings
supplied by two of the predicting firms. There was a tendency for the correlations to be
lowest (and negative) in the poorest-quality grouping, but they did not get systematically
higher with quality; the highest correlations tended to occur in the middle groupings. When
the corporations were classified by a high, medium, or low price-earnings multiple; or past
growth rates of earnings; or future growth rates of earnings, sales, or assets, no pronounced
or significant patterns emerged.86 Chapter Two
rates were stronger predictors than calculated ones. Overall we can
conclude that mechanically calculated growth rates are not very effective
predictors, tending to be inferior to the predictions of the analyst. This
finding is similar to that of Little (1962) for British corporations and of
Lintner and Glauber (1972) for U.S. ones that growth does not tend to
persist. By contrast, analysts' perceived past growth rates were somewhat
effective as predictors for the periods of our study, especially those
representing earnings growth over a reasonably long period of time.
Indeed, the best of the past perceptions of growth were about as reliable
predictors as were the individual analyst's explicit predictions.
We noted earlier that price-earnings ratios may be considered to
contain implicit forecasts of earnings growth. When we compared the
price-earnings multiple and the multiple calculated on the basis of aver-
age estimates of "normalized" earnings per share with realized earnings
growth, it was evident that the ratios are generally as good predictors as
either forecasts based on historical data or those made by many analysts.
To put the point in a different way, there did not seem to be any more
information in the predictions themselves than was already impounded in
market prices.
2.4 Are the Expectations "Rational"?
A major question to ask of any expectations data is whether they are
"rational." Unfortunately, our data are not really suitable for investigat-
ing this subject properly. In consequence, the tests that we do conduct are
at best only slightly indicative of whether the rational-expectations
hypothesis is appropriate. Fortunately, the analyses may be of interest in
any case to indicate further features of our data and of the quantities
being predicted.
The difficulty with our data for the rational-expectations hypothesis is
that they are primarily cross-sectional. Nine years of annual data would
be of rather limited use for time-series analysis even if we had data for all
our forecasters in all years. However, some predictors were in the sample
for only two or three years. Even when a predictor's forecasts were
available throughout all the period or most of it, the firm did not cover
each of the companies in our sample in all years. In consequence, our
data were not suitable for many obvious tests of forecast rationality.
To accomplish any investigation, we shall have to treat the forecasts
made for different companies as providing a random sample of forecasts.
Such an assumption would also have been implicit in the comparisons
made in section 2.3 had formal inferences been drawn from them, but it
does not seem to be entirely suitable for our data.
We found earlier in analyzing the forecasts that a model in which
earnings varied with a few important quantities, such as perhaps the87 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
overall growth of the economy, may provide a useful way of looking at
the formation of predictions. Later we shall suggest that a similar model is
useful for realizations. All the realizations over a particular period are
presumably based on the same values of these key variables. If their
realized values differ from the predicted ones, these few failures in
predicting the common factors will show up as common elements of the
differences of the predictions from the realizations. In particular, each
realization may differ in a systematic way from its expected value depend-
ing on all information available at the time the forecasts were made.
However, a factor analysis involving the realizations and predictions is
not sensible since it presumes that the predictors have no ability to
forecast the firm-specific variations. That is, forecasters may well have
predictive ability beyond their assessment of the common variables.
The second problem is that differences between realizations and fore-
casts may be correlated across firms, affecting the significance levels and
powers of tests. This would also arise from the first problem. There is no
obvious a priori structure to impose on such correlations, and we lack
observations sufficient to estimate them. Hence we shall have to make
the standard cross-sectional assumption of independent residuals.
We can also expect heteroscedasticity to be a problem with cross-
section data of the sort we have been using. In other words, we can expect
some companies to be harder to predict than others so that residual
variances should vary among companies. We have no basis, however, for
specifying the form of the heteroscedasticity for Aitken estimation.
1
4 As a
result, we used the ordinary least-squares estimates. To prevent the
misleading inferences that may result fron heteroscedasticity, however,
we use the variance-covariance matrix suggested by White (1980) in
performing our tests. This allows specifically for the effects of heterosce-
dasticity without requiring us to specify its form.
A critical requirement for considering a forecast to be "rational" in the
sense used by Muth (1961) is that the mathematical expectation of the
realization conditional on the forecast should be the forecast;
1
5 i.e., we
can express the realized growth over period t (gryt) as
14. Routine use of a quadratic function of the independent variables as an "explanation"
of the heteroscedasticity could (and did) produce some negative estimates or tiny positive
ones that, if used, would have dominated the Aitken estimates.
15. The criterion is not as simple or straightforward as it often appears. There is a
problem with what is being forecast—that is, about the quantity for which an expectation is
formed—and this affects the criterion. Explicitly, if the expectations refer to a nonlinear
function of the quantity it is assumed is being predicted, then the expected value of the
transformed quantity is not usually the transformation of the expected quantity. In our case
this is particularly relevant because the five-year growth could be expressed in terms other
than the annual rates of growth we use. If the rational-expectations hypothesis holds for the
annual rates of growth, it will not hold for the total proportionate increase over five years.88 Chapter Two
(2.4-1) gr,t = gp,t-l + Ut,
where ,gp^-\ is the predicted growth rate for period t, made in period
t— 1, and ut is a random variable with mean zero uncorrelated with
SPtt-i- Following Theil (1966) and Friedman (1980), who tested the
"rationality" of interest-rate forecasts, we regress the realizations (gr t)
on the forecasters' predictions {sp,t-i) according to
(2.4-2) *r,, = fl + te,,r-i + K,
and investigate the null hypothesis of unbiasedness defined by
(2.4-3) H0:(a,b) = (0,1).
The results of testing Ho for the long-term predictors are summarized
in table 2.18 in terms of the significance levels beyond which Ho cannot be
rejected. We can reject a finding of unbiasedness in the majority of cases.
This is not a uniform pattern, however. Few rejections occurred for the
1964-69 predictions. By contrast, the hypothesis is rejected for all predic-
tors in the 1965-70 comparisons.
The estimates of equation (2.4-2) corresponding to these results are
shown in table 2.19. While one cannot ascribe the rejection of hypothesis
(2.4-3) simply to one coefficient or the other, the problem seems to
involve both coefficients. Rather surprisingly, there is no clear-cut pat-
tern to the rejection. It is not, for instance, the case that the a coefficients
tend always to be positive or the b coefficients to be less than unity.
Unfortunately, it is not appropriate to aggregate these results over time.
The five-year nature of the forecasts and of the realizations means that
successive values of ut may very well be correlated. For this reason also,
Table 2.18 Significance Levels beyond Which Hypothesis (2.4-3)
Cannot Be Rejected











































































NOTE. Significance levels are results of asymptotic x
2 tests























Long-Term Predictors' Estimates of Equation (2.4-2) (standard





































































































































































































































































































one would not expect a lack of serial correlation between the ut to be an
implication of rational expectations.
The pattern found for the short-term forecasts is rather different from
that found for the longer-term ones.
1
6 Here not only can the null hypoth-
esis (a = 0, b = 1) be rejected in most cases, but the individual parts can
often be rejected. In particular, the coefficients b tended to be signifi-
cantly less than unity.
With the short-term predictors, we may now look at whether the
residuals are serially correlated. More precisely, under the rational-
expectations hypothesis, any predictive information contained in the
extent to which the last forecast missed should be incorporated in the
forecast. To test both of these aspects of the rational-expectations
hypothesis, we ran the regression
(2.4-4) (gFft - gpj-i) = a + bsPlt-\
+ c(gr)f_1-f_1gP),_2) + u,.
Under the rational-expectations hypothesis, all three coefficients should
be zero.
Table 2.20 reports the results for 1964-65 and for 1965-66. In the first
case, the overall hypothesis can be rejected for all predictions, the
column headed "sig" indicating the significance level beyond which the
hypothesis can be accepted. While the constant often provides by itself
the basis for the rejections, the b coefficients also often did not conform
to the hypothesis either. The hypothesis that c = 0 could not be rejected
in most cases. The overall hypothesis fared a bit better in the next year,
which is the one most favorable to it, but rejection still occurs in many
instances. Rejection now does occur on account of the c coefficients in
several instances.
We cannot perform this same test with the long-term predictions
because of the five-year gap between forecast and realization. We may,
however, ask whether the extent to which the most recent difference
between the actual (one-year) rate of growth and the five-year rate of
growth predicted in the previous year actually has predictive content.
With only two or three exceptions, the hypothesis that this difference had
no predictive power could not be rejected at the 0.05 level. The results for
both aspects of this interpretation of the rational-expectations hypothesis
jointly paralleled those found in table 2.19.
Another important property of rational expectations is that they
efficiently incorporate all available information including the information
contained in previously realized outcomes. Although we have seen that
previous misses sometimes have (ex post) additional predictive informa-
16. Unfortunately, the predictors which made forecasts for five consecutive years did























Short-Term Predictors' Estimates of Equation (2.4-4) (standard


































































































































































Significant at the .05 level.
^Significance level of hypothesis that all coefficients are zero.
tion with the short-term forecasts, we may wonder whether such informa-
tion will also lead to subsequent revision of forecasts. Under the rational-
expectations hypothesis, the change in a forecast made for a given future
time should not be related to errors made prior to the current forecast.
Any useful information contained in the forecast error during period t — 2
should have affected the t - 1 forecast and should not affect the change in
the forecast from period t-\tot.
This notion cannot be applied easily to our data, because successive
forecasts are for different times. We may, however, consider the hypoth-
esis that for forecast purposes the short-term growth rate can be consid-
ered a parameter following a random walk measured with error and so
investigate the usual error-learning hypothesis on a cross-sectional basis.
Explicitly, this hypothesis states that the change in forecast can be consid-
ered a linear function only of the difference of the most recent realization
from its forecast value and not of previously observed differences. Speci-
fically, we investigate92 Chapter Two
(2.4-5) t+1gpJ - gPtt_ i=A + B{grt - &Ptt_
and consider the null hypothesis to be that C = 0. In considering this
hypothesis, it would not be reasonable to assume that A and B are
constant across companies. This would suggest that a random coefficients
model may be more appropriate. However, since the major effect of such
a specification is to produce heteroscedasticity and since all our infer-
ences already are based on allowing for heteroscedasticity explicitly, our
procedures for inference may be considered adequate even in the face of
variable coefficients.
Table 2.21 shows the results for the short-term predictors for the three
years where it is feasible to pursue the investigation. The estimated
coefficient C giving the effect of the error made in the period prior to the
previous forecast on the current forecast change generally is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. Nevertheless, there are many instances in the
table, especially in the 1964-65 revision period, where one-period prior
forecast errors did appear to influence forecast revisions, a finding incon-
sistent with the simple error-learning model.
1
7
As Table 2.21 also shows, the values of R
2 are generally quite low.
Altough part of the variance not accounted for may come from the
variation among companies of coefficient B, the general impression is
that the error-learning hypothesis is not strong. It remains an open
question, however, whether the explanation is that earnings do not follow
one of the standard models of expectations formation.
By and large, these results do not seem favorable to the rational-
expectations hypothesis. Of course, this may be because of the inappro-
priateness of testing the hypothesis with cross-section data. To shed
further light on this issue, we present, as table 2.22, the average errors of
our short-term and long-term forecasters taken as a group. The average
errors are measured by the differences between the realization and the
average prediction of those forecasters making predictions for the com-
panies in question.
In the early part of our period, both the short- and long-term predictors
tended to make forecasts that were too low. Realizations tended to
exceed forecasts during most of this early period. This may simply indi-
cate a failure to anticipate the continuation of the extraordinary eco-
nomic expansion experienced through the period. It may also reflect the
underestimation of change frequently found in investigating forecasts
and reported by Theil (1966).
In the later period, a similar underestimation of change did not char-
acterize the forecasts. The forecasts were too high in some years, but
17. It should also be noted that in some cases the changes in forecast from year to year
were correlated.93 Consensus, Accuracy, and Completeness of Earnings Growth Forecasts
Table 2.21 Short-Term Predictors' Estimates of Equation (2.4-5) (standard






























































































































































































Significant at the .05 level.
during others they were too low. The only pattern we found consistently
was that in years when the forecasts were too high (low), all forecasters
tended to be too high (low).
This latter finding is the sort of pattern we might expect from a few
common factors throwing off all forecasts. However, insofar as the
continuation of the economic expansion lies behind the results, it does
not seem to account for the values of b that were found. We do not find
accentuation of forecast differences, which would produce values of b
greater than unity in (2.4-2). That is the pattern we might expect if the
forecast rankings reflected sensitivity to economic expansion.94 Chapter Two
Table 2.22 Average Forecast Errors across Sample




















A broader, and perhaps the most appropriate, test of expectations
rationality is whether forecasters effectively incorporate all of the avail-
able historical information. To investigate this matter, we asked if there
was some combination of historical information and analysts' forecasts
that together might be better than using any individual piece of informa-
tion alone. We asked, ex post, how an analyst could have made the best
linear one-year prediction for earnings in, say, 1962, given that she had
available to her the information now available to us. To deal simply with
the problems of missing observations, we concentrate on the average of
the available predictions rather than on each individually or some best
linear combination of them.
Needless to say, in each year there is some combination of predicted
short-term growth, long-term growth, eight- to ten-year historical
growth, etc., which would be more highly correlated with realizations
than would the predictions of any one forecaster alone. This fact is
demonstrated by comparing the seventh column of table 2.23 with the
earlier columns. In the earlier columns gp is the average predicted growth
and gpl and gp2 are the simple historical growth rates defined above.
Column 7 shows that using the best linear combination of the predictors
plus historical information does improve forecasting ability, although the
increase over the average of the predictors is not great. The important
question is whether the combination that is calculated to work well in onei § i
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year will continue to work in a subsequent one. Such is not the case.
Instead, the superiority of the linear combination disappears and it is
decidedly inferior to the average of the predictors. These correlations are
shown in column 8 of table 2.23. Stated differently, there is no combina-
tion of analysts' forecasts and historical information that could be used to
make better predictions on a consistent basis.
1
8 This result suggests that
there is no systematic relationship between historical and realized growth
that is not directly incorporated into the forecasts.
1
9
The last column of table 2.23 shows the correlation of the simple
price-earnings multiple with the realized growth of earnings. The price-
earnings multiple was as good as, and often better than, the average of
the analysts' predictions. Since PIE multiples are influenced by more than
forecasted growth (as will be shown explicitly in chapter 4), this is a
surprising result. It suggests that whatever information there is in the
forecasts gets assimilated quickly.
Our investigation of the rationality of the forecasts presents mixed
results. We were able to reject the major implications of the narrow
interpretation of the hypothesis and can be fairly confident that the
standard explicit hypothesis of expectations formation is not correct. We
cannot> however, reject the broader interpretation of the ra-
tional-expectations hypothesis. We found no consistent or coherent pat-
tern indicating that readily available information is not efficiently in-
corporated in the forecasts, and it appears that any useful information in
the forecasts does get rationally included in share prices. To put the point
in a different way, there does not seem to be any more information in the
predictions themselves than is already contained in market prices.
18. For a similar analysis of interest-rate forecasts, see Friedman (1980, pp. 8, 9).
19. This analysis was done only for five years because of lack of data for later years for gpl
and gp2, which were past growth rates as "perceived" by two of our forecasters.